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As the title suggests, Guillaume Bignon’s Excusing Sinners and Blaming 
God targets two objections to Calvinism (more on exactly what “Calvin-
ism” amounts to in a minute). The first holds that Calvinism undermines 
human responsibility and free will; according to the second, Calvinism 
undermines God’s moral perfection and makes him the author of sin. 
Bignon aims to show that Calvinism is not, in fact, susceptible to these 
objections.
Bignon restricts his use of the term “Calvinism” to refer to “Calvinist 
determinism,” which he takes to be the claim that “everything that comes 
to pass is determined, or necessitated by prior conditions, . . . [specifically,] 
God’s providential degree and the full scope of his supernatural activity, 
whatever shape one thinks that may take” (4–5). One might wonder about 
this definitional stipulation, however clear. First, this definition of Calvin-
ism is compatible with the truth of various forms of universalism, includ-
ing what I’ve referred to elsewhere as “necessary universalism,” which 
“claims that it is a necessary truth that none are eternally damned” (Kevin 
Timpe, Arguing about Religion [Routledge, 2009], 433). Allowing such a 
view to count as Calvinism is strange, particularly given Bignon’s reliance 
on the Westminster Confession of Faith. Second, there are theologians 
who self-identify as Calvinists but who wouldn’t satisfy Bignon’s defini-
tion (e.g., Oliver Crisp, whom Bignon mentions in n. 14 (7), as well as the 
historical figures discussed in Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept 
of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology, edited by Willem J. van 
Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde [Baker Academic, 2010]). Finally, 
Calvinist determinism so defined doesn’t entail theological compatibilism 
(that is, the view that human moral responsibility is compatible with the 
truth of theological determinism). And it’s clear from the book as a whole 
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that Bignon’s Calvinism is intended to include both theological compatibil-
ism and theological determinism.
Excusing Sinners and Blaming God is divided into two unequal sections. 
The first section (152 pages) focuses on arguments that Calvinism entails 
no human freedom or responsibility (i.e., “excusing sinners”), while the 
second section (61 pages) responds to arguments that the truth of Calvin-
ism would entail that God is morally suspect (i.e., “blaming God”).
Part I canvasses a number of versions of “excusing sinners” arguments 
against compatibilism. The vast majority of this section of the book en-
gages philosophical and not theological material. Some of the versions 
of the “excusing sinners” argument are such that I’ve not seen them sug-
gested in the literature, e.g.: “puppets are determined; puppets are not 
morally responsible; humans are determined; therefore humans are not 
morally responsible” (17). It’s perplexing to me that Bignon would think 
he needs to argue against arguments of this sort.
The discussion of other “excusing sinners” arguments trades on how 
compatibilists and incompatibilists differ with respect to understanding 
various terms. For instance, “the coercion argument” (chap. 2) is summa-
rized as follows (keeping Bignon’s numbering):
12. If determinism is true, then all human choices are coerced.
13. If a person’s choice is coerced, then that person cannot be morally re-
sponsible for it.
 Therefore,
14. If determinism is true, then no person can be morally responsible for any 
of his choices.
 Which is to say
6. Determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. (21)
Bignon points out that the Calvinist must reject premise 12, since “true co-
ercion excludes moral responsibility; there is no use contesting this point” 
(23). According to Bignon, we ought to reject premise 12 since “on theistic 
compatibilism, in usual cases of human free choices, God does not de-
termine the actions of humans against their wills, but through their wills” 
(23). Note, however, that there are cases of coercion that go through an 
individual’s will but still plausibly provide a moral excuse (e.g., “give me 
your wallet or I’ll shoot”). So the mere inclusion of the human agent’s will 
as an instrumental cause of the action doesn’t entail that the agent whose 
will is involved is responsible.
A stronger response to the coercion argument is Bignon’s attempt to 
show that coercion is relevantly different from theological determinism. 
Bignon writes that “for a choice to be free such that its maker is morally 
responsible, it need not be undetermined, but it does need to be deter-
mined (assuming determinism is true) by the agent’s own desires, which 
flow from the agent’s God-given character and inclinations” (37). Here, 
BOOK REVIEWS 375
he presses what is referred to as a “soft-line response” to manipulation 
arguments, since he thinks that manipulation but not determinism under-
mines moral responsibility. Indeed, Bignon claims that the manipulation 
arguments offered by Derk Pereboom (the four-case argument), Alfred 
Mele (the zygote argument), Robert Kane (the “Walden Two” argument), 
and Katherin Rogers (the “divine controller” argument) all fail precisely 
because the relevant difference between manipulation and determinism 
is this God-given-ness. However, notice that if theological determinism is 
true, all cases of manipulation are ultimately God-given. What one would 
want, and what one doesn’t find, is an account of why responsibility de-
spite God-given-ness is compatible with God’s directly causing an agent to 
choose, but incompatible with the God-given-ness that goes through any 
human agent (that is, a manipulator). Bignon’s response to various other 
manipulation arguments (chap. 3) proceeds along similar lines.
The book picks up steam later in Section 1, particularly in chapters 5 
and 6. These chapters are much denser, and much more careful, than the 
early chapters. It’s here that Bignon’s case is strongest. Chapter 5, still more 
philosophical than theological, is on van Inwagen’s consequence argu-
ment, which he thinks depends for its purported success either on begging 
the question or on contested issues related to “ability” and “the ability to 
do otherwise” (67). Bignon often doesn’t exercise proper caution in un-
derstanding van Inwagen, as when he thinks that “having a choice about 
whether p is true” can only be understood as involving libertarianism (see 
Peter van Inwagen, “How to Think about the Problem of Free Will,” The 
Journal of Ethics 12 [2008]: 327–341) or when Bignon suggests that what 
van Inwagen “has in view is libertarian free will” (63), a phrase that van 
Inwagen abhors. While there is recent work on the consequence argument 
that Bignon doesn’t engage, he raises some important challenges for those 
incompatibilists who employ the consequence and similar arguments.
In this context, Bignon defends a conditional analysis of the ability to 
do otherwise. He differentiates between a categorical ability, expressed in 
PAPAll, and a conditional ability, expressed in PAPIf.
PAPAll : a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if, all things 
inside and outside the person being just as they are at the moment of choice, he 
could have done otherwise.
PAPIf : a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could 
have done otherwise, had his inner desires inclined him to do so at the mo-
ment of choice. (72)
As a theological compatibilist and determinist who believes that humans 
are at least sometimes morally responsible, Bignon claims that PAPAll is 
false while PAPIf is true. But the truth of PAPIf is compatible with theo-
logical determinism. “To say that a person has a choice understood condi-
tionally is precisely to say that the person could choose otherwise, if only 
something (like his inner desires) had been different. . . . The only analysis 
of choice that has so far been shown (and admitted) to be necessary for 
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moral responsibility” (84–85) is the conditional ability. And the various 
examples that are intended to show PAPAll not only fail to demonstrate 
its truth, but “only reaffirm a PAPIf” (75). Bignon argues that PAPIf was 
never supposed to be about what is sufficient for moral responsibility, 
only necessary (96). While this is true, without knowing the other condi-
tions on moral responsibility, it’s hard to evaluate whether his defense of 
the conditional analysis is ultimately successful. Nevertheless, chapter 5’s 
discussion of conditional analyses and classical compatibilism is one of 
the most interesting I’ve seen in recent literature.
In the last chapter of Part I, Bignon seeks to show not only that the vari-
ous arguments canvased earlier don’t refute compatibilism, but that there 
are arguments that move us “beyond mere skepticism” (99) to the truth 
of compatibilism. The argument proceeds as follows. Bignon thinks that 
libertarianism requires the truth of PAPAll and that there are theological 
reasons for rejecting it (more on these reasons below). Therefore, liber-
tarianism is false. (Notice that this argument would at most show that 
theological compatibilism is true, but not that theological determinism is 
also true. So at most Part I shows not that Calvinist determinism is true, 
but that its truth wouldn’t mean that humans aren’t morally responsible.) 
However, dialectically, since Bignon is pushing back against two argu-
ments against Calvinism that both affirm the existence of evil, the as-
sumption that humans are free and responsible, given that they’re sinful, 
is understandable.
Why think that PAPAll is false? Bignon thinks that Frankfurt-style con-
siderations are unsuccessful. Instead, he develops two independent ar-
guments. First, PAPAll is “refuted by the coherence of a God who is both 
impeccable and praiseworthy and hence [shows] that one can be praise-
worthy without the categorial ability to do otherwise” (164). Second, Big-
non argues that accepting PAPAll either leads to Pelagianism (since for any 
series of choices, a human could have chosen a non-sinful option at each 
step) or universalism (since humans can’t avoid all sinful choices, but thus 
are not blameworthy for them).
It’s not clear to me that these arguments are especially problematic for 
the libertarian. The libertarian could hold, for instance, that God’s moral 
perfection is compatible both with his decision to create and not to cre-
ate, and thus there are at least some categorical abilities that even God 
has. God’s impeccability, the impossibility “for God to do anything but 
that which is righteous” (105), doesn’t rule out that God has the ability to 
do otherwise. Similarly, libertarians can give accounts of divine freedom 
that don’t rule out divine praiseworthiness (my “The Best Thing in Life 
is Free: The Compatibility of Divine Freedom and God’s Essential Moral 
Perfection,” in Free Will and Classical Theism, ed. Hugh McCann [Oxford 
University Press, 2016], 133–151, is just one instance). Bignon thinks that 
divine freedom shows the ability to do otherwise isn’t required for moral 
responsibility:
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31. God always chooses and acts righteously, and lacks the categorical abil-
ity to do otherwise than acting righteously.
32. God is always morally praiseworthy, that is, he is morally responsible, 
for his righteous choices and actions.
 Therefore
33. Moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise.
Notice, however, that this argument is invalid as it stands. For the argu-
ment to be valid, the conclusion needs to be replaced with:
33*. Moral responsibility does not require the ability to do other than to 
act righteously.
And there are incompatibilist views of freedom (both human and di-
vine) that are compatible with 33*, despite Bignon’s argument against “lev-
els of granularity for actions” (110–116). So I don’t see that this argument 
need worry the incompatibilist. Moreover, Bignon is wrong to claim this 
sort of response (which he rightly attributes to me) “concedes” (132) that 
moral responsibility is compatible with determinism given that it holds 
responsibility is compatible with one’s moral character ruling out sinful 
actions. As Bignon notes earlier “determinism is [the view] that everything 
that comes to pass is determined” (4, emphasis added). My view certainly 
does not involve thinking that determinism so understood is compatible 
with moral responsibility.
Likewise, Bignon’s reductio fails. For one, while I think the libertarian 
should reject what I referred to as necessary universalism above, that horn 
of the reductio would need to show that even contingent universalism 
(the view that as a matter of fact all are redeemed) is false. But Bignon 
can’t do this without engaging the soteriological doctrines that he set aside 
in chapter 1. The other horn, namely the charge of Pelagianism, can also 
be avoided. As Bignon constructs it, the truth of PAPAll would entail that 
a human can do a morally good action simply on the basis of works and 
without the grace of God. But this would only be true if a lack of grace is 
part of the outside factors that we hold fixed, and the libertarian need not 
(and, I think, ought not) grant this. Bignon could argue that such grace is 
not given in each case, but again this move would require engaging the 
soteriological doctrines that he sets aside.
Section II focuses on the problem of evil faced by theological determin-
ists: “It is alleged that if determinism is true, if free will is not libertarian, 
then humans are not morally responsible for their sin, and therefore, God 
is—which is presumably unacceptable” (167). Bignon begins by noting 
that the existence of free will as the libertarian understands it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for responding to the logical problem of evil. Why 
is it not necessary? Here Bignon appeals to skeptical theism, though not 
by name:
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If the skeptic wants to use the existence of evil to disprove the existence of 
an all-loving, all-powerful God, then he needs to carry the heavy burden of 
proof of showing that it is not possible for God to have morally sufficient 
reasons to allow evil. But how will he do that? Unless and until that hap-
pens, Calvinists and Arminians can maintain that God has morally sufficient 
reasons for permitting evil [even if they don’t know what they are]. (171)
And “no Calvinist in his right mind should presume to know for a fact 
what specific good reason God has for permitting” evils (174).
Why would libertarianism not be sufficient for responding to the prob-
lem of evil? Because there are evils in the world that are not justified on the 
basis of libertarian conceptions of free will. (Somewhat surprising, Bignon 
grants in passing that Calvinism is worse than Arminianism with respect 
to the problem of evil since there are evils that “God could have brought 
about with less suffering on Calvinism, since God could have controlled 
the inner workings of the heart more successfully” [175].)
Bignon claims the argument schema to get from Calvinism to God’s 
authorship of sin is the following:
(Premise 1)—Calvinism entails [Proposition p about divine involvement in 
evil].
(Premise 2)—But in fact, [Proposition p] is false.
(Conclusion)—Therefore Calvinism is false. (178–179)
There are three ways to instantiate this argument schema, which Bignon 
refers to as “foggy,” “ambitious,” and “timid.” Foggy versions of the argu-
ment replace p with a claim such as “God is the author of sin.” But these 
versions are foggy precisely because we’re not told enough about what 
precisely the claim means:
When one digs deeper into the possible meaning of ‘author of sin,’ what 
emerges is that objectors take issue with the Calvinist God for standing be-
hind evil. . . . One can complain that the Calvinist God brings about evil, or 
one can complain how he does. The ambitious recipe does the former, the 
timid does the latter. (180)
If the charge is simply that God brings about evil, the objection is am-
bitious in that it would cut against all forms of traditional Christianity, 
Arminian as well as Calvinist. In the last chapter, Bignon argues that a 
timid attempt involves “properly identifying a unique feature of Calvin-
ism but begs the question by its failure to establish that this property is in 
fact problematic” (190). It’s this section of the book that I think theologians 
will find most engaging.
Bignon notes on the last page of Part I that the arguments therein show 
at most that theological compatibilism is true, but not that theological de-
terminism is also true. So at most Part I shows that if Calvinist determin-
ism were true, human moral responsibility wouldn’t be ruled out. The 
arguments of Part II don’t show that theological determinism is true either; 
rather, they show that if Calvinist determinism is true, it does not follow 
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that God is morally blameworthy for causing evil. In this sense, Excusing 
Sinners and Blaming God is a defensive book. What reasons are there for 
thinking theological determinism is true? Bignon mentions both biblical 
grounds and philosophical grounds (229). The biblical issues aren’t dis-
cussed at great length, and when they are, I think the treatment is overly 
confident (see, e.g., 176–177). The philosophical grounds all proceed from 
objections to libertarianism. And, as Bignon notes elsewhere, the falsity of 
libertarianism doesn’t entail theological determinism.
It’s not always clear what primary audience Bignon’s book is intended 
for. The level of rigor and care in discussing distinctions and different ver-
sions of arguments often suggests its primary audience is professional 
philosophers. But at other times it considers versions of arguments or 
claims that one simply doesn’t—and shouldn’t—find in the philosophical 
literature. Here see, for instance, the discussion of whether determinism 
necessarily entails manipulation in chapter 3 or the discussion in chapter 
4 of whether determinism entails mental illness. At times, Bignon’s defini-
tions and treatment of historical issues are perplexing, especially if he in-
tends theologians and not just philosophers to be among his audience. As 
an instance here, see the claim that “all theologians who affirm libertarian 
free will” are “Arminians” (10). I suspect Anselm, for instance, would be 
surprised to learn that he is an Arminian. One final criticism: the press that 
puts out a book such as this fails if does not require it to have an index.
Despite the limitations I’ve noted, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God 
is worth reading. As Paul Helm says in the volume’s forward, this book 
is “as thorough defense [of theological determinism and compatibilism] 
as you’ll find” (ix). As such, it should be read both by philosophers of 
religion interested in various models of divine providence and by those 
philosophers interested in the compatibilism/incompatibilism debates.
Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven , edited by T. 
Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 
xii + 365. $110 (hardcover).
DOLORES G. MORRIS, University of South Florida
Paradise Understood is a collection of philosophical reflections on Heaven 
that is impressively diverse both in its authorship and its subject matter. 
As we learn in the introduction, eight of the seventeen essays in this vol-
ume were invited contributions by established scholars, an additional 
seven essays were selected from a competition, and the remaining two 
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